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Abstract. This is the third and final installment of an article by Mr. James A. Kinnison. Mr. Kinnison is a 
political science graduate student from the University of New Mexico and specializes in international 
relations and national security. This installment provides opinions on terrorism challenges for 
intelligence and law enforcement. (Correction from last week. The second installment’s note (xx) was 
left off the text. It is Vandenko, I. (November 16, 1995.) Kuda edut radioaktivnye konteynery iz 
Chechnya? Izvestiya, p. 2. 
 
Battling the Hydra: The Challenge to Intelligence and Law Enforcement. 
 
During the Crusades, it often happened that the enemies met at banquets or feasts, before or after the 
battles. On one of those occasions, Saladin, one of the great leaders of the Muslim side, received some 
of the European chiefs. Among them was Richard the Lion-Hearted, King of England, a great, powerful 
man who fiercely wielded a two-handed sword. “This is how we wage war,” said the king. He took the 
sword, set an iron helmet on the table, and smote it with a mighty blow, denting it. He turned to 
Saladin. “Now let us see how you do it!” he exclaimed. Saladin replied, “We each have our own 
methods.” He took a silk scarf he was wearing and dropped it on his razor-sharp scimitar. And the scarf 
was cut in two. “This is another method of war.” Saladin smiled thinly. Count de Marenches: The Fourth 
World War 
 
In Greek mythology, the Hydra was a nine-headed serpent that grew two heads for every one that was 
cut off. The new challenges facing antiterrorist and counterterrorist forces are very much like the Hydra-
-for every terrorist organization destroyed, more are likely to emerge. The difficulties facing the 
intelligence community and law enforcement are not insurmountable but will require new approaches 
to national security. 
 
By intelligence I do not mean the James Bond, John LeCarre cloak-and-dagger myth of intelligence. 
Intelligence is the collection of information, the analysis of that data, and the production of opinions 
useful to policy makers. Sherman Kent, one of the architects of the American intelligence system, wrote 
that “If foreign policy is the shield of the republic, .... then strategic intelligence is the thing that gets the 
shield to the right place at the right time. It is also the thing that stands ready to guide the sword” (xxi). 
 
Given the history of our war on drugs, detection of the importation of nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons to the United States is difficult, if not impossible. Roughly 1.25 million people arrive in the 
United States (US) each day, and less than 5 percent of the 1.36 billion kilograms of cargo arriving every 
day is inspected (xxii). With these numbers, and the inherent difficulty in detecting illicit materials, US 
Customs cannot prevent the entry of fissile material or other weapons components (xxiii). 
 
Another emerging problem lies in the command-and-control structure of terrorist groups. Rather than 
the tight cell structure of secular terrorists, religious terrorists may be composed of extended families or 
tightly interwoven communities, and directions are as likely to come from clerics as terrorist 
commanders. Not only will the tight community structure make it more difficult for law enforcement 
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and intelligence agencies to penetrate potential terrorist groups, but maintenance of First Amendment 
rights will make it all the more difficult to determine whether religious preachings constitute a threat to 
national security. While the US Supreme Court has established the principal of clear and present danger 
as a guideline, proving that the words of a cleric prompted an illegal act can only supply the basis of a 
criminal conviction. Linking words to act cannot serve as a preventative measure or predictive indicator 
of intent (xxiv). The application of sedition charges against Sheik Rahman prevented future bombings in 
New York only after the World Trade Center bombing prompted an investigation of his teachings and 
followers. 
 
The law enforcement and intelligence communities are facing groups that are difficult to penetrate; 
have access to high-tech weaponry, communications and support infrastructure; and are more fluid and 
capable of mobilizing far more quickly than state agencies. Combating this threat will require a new 
approach to strategic intelligence, including a greater reliance upon human intelligence (HUMINT) rather 
than relying exclusively on black box technologies. To quote the Count de Marenches, former head of 
French intelligence, “It requires a whole new strategic system to address and cope with it--a system of 
conventional weaponry and unconventional tactics that is capable of ensuring the peace the way the 
nuclear balance has ensured the peace for the last half century” (xxv). 
 
As a starting point for this new approach, I would suggest four foundations. The first step is 
understanding the nature of the threat. We are no longer dealing exclusively with a state-oriented 
system based on rational calculations of foreign policy. Analyzing the threat today may involve 
understanding the mentality of Medieval Islam and how that philosophy can be expressed through 
modern technology. Understanding these threats will require a multidisciplinary approach. Colin Gray, in 
his book, War, Peace and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century, outlines such an 
approach to intelligence based on five elements (xxvi): 
 
..      History 
..      Culture 
..      Geography 
..      Technology 
..      The Strategic Mosaic 
This holistic approach--while highly demanding--will be necessary to understand the dynamics of 
emerging security threats before they become crises. Analysts trained in the social sciences will have to 
have a greater understanding of emerging technological changes in order to build accurate threat 
assessments. Just as importantly, however, will be the role of the hard sciences. Current remote-sensing 
devices are not sensitive enough or are incapable of detecting advanced weaponry (xxvii). Finding new 
yet affordable approaches to antiterrorism--especially in support of intelligence gathering and analysis--
will present a significant challenge. 
 
Secondly, we must accept that terrorist targets will no longer be limited to overseas interests. Future 
targets will be within the border of the US. While domestic terrorism in the US is nearly as old as the 
country itself, it has been relatively benign (xxviii). The growth of militias, however, raises the prospects 
of more militarized actions. Additionally, the growth of international travel and the presence of 
numerous emigrant enclaves in the US present opportunities for foreign terrorist groups to operate 
within the US with relative ease. 
 
The third step must be increased coordination between law enforcement and intelligence. Such 
coordination has already produced positive results in combating the flow of drugs into the country (xxix) 
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and will be all the more important in assessing the risks of domestic groups which may resort to 
violence. Local law enforcement is more likely to identify possible problem areas but may not have the 
legal foundation or manpower necessary to carry out further investigations. 
 
The fourth step will be the most difficult--coordinating the law enforcement, intelligence, and legal 
systems of the international system. This step was outlined at the G-7 summit in Lyon France on June 
27, 1996 (xxx). Essentially, it calls for expanded counterterrorist cooperation and capabilities, expansion 
of legal codes, and enforcement of antiterrorist legislation--including international sanctions on states 
supporting or harboring terrorists, development of bilateral and multilateral agreements designed to 
facilitate investigations of suspected terrorist groups, reduced funding for terrorists by close scrutiny of 
front organizations, and increased coordination of intelligence and greater intelligence sharing between 
member states (xxxi). Implementation of these measures will require time, but while they are necessary, 
they are also idealistic. Nations tend to be very skeptical of sharing intelligence, fearing that their 
methods and assets may be compromised. Additionally, state interests may preclude the coordination 
of extradition laws or the maintenance of sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism. 
 
In spite of these difficulties, coordinating international efforts holds the greatest potential to counter 
terrorism. INTERPOL has been used in the past as a secure means of sharing intelligence on terrorists, 
and its mission could be expanded to facilitate greater intelligence sharing while protecting national 
assets. One of the most difficult aspects of intelligence is identifying crucial indicators and warnings of 
impending threats. Using a central point, such as INTERPOL, to serve as a clearing house for information, 
the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of member nations could be alerted to potential threats 
without compromising sources. To again cite the Count de Marenches, “we must understand that while 
cooperation is the most complex weapon, it is the most lethal one” (xxxii). Sharing intelligence will be a 
long reach, bridged only when terrorism drives states together for common defense. 
 
In summary, we are facing a highly volatile and fluid new world disorder in which non-state actors--
utilizing available technologies--will be able to challenge the security and sovereignty of nation states. 
Peering into the future, one realizes that the new security challenges are shrouded in a thick blanket of 
fog. The challenge to law enforcement, intelligence, and the academic community lies in finding new 
predictive and analytical tools for the formulation of statecraft. Nearly fifty years ago, Sherman Kent, 
wrote that the role of intelligence was to serve the policy makers: 
 
“Intelligence is not the formulator of objectives; it is not the drafter of policy; it is not the maker of 
plans; it is not the carrier out of operations. Intelligence is ancillary to these; to use the dreadful cliché, it 
performs a service function. Its job is to see that the doers are generally well informed, its job is to stand 
behind them with the book opened to the right page, to call their attention to the stubborn fact that 
they may be neglecting, and - at their request to analyze alternative courses of action without indicating 
choice" (xxxiii). 
 
As we approach the Millennium, finding the right page becomes all the more difficult. The real threat of 
terrorism does not lie in the power of criminal arsenals, but in the potential failure of states to find the 
necessary weapons to battle the Hydra. (Notes. (xxi) Kent, S. (1949.) Strategic intelligence for American 
world policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. viii; (xxii) Allison; G.T., Cote, O. R. Jr.; 
Falkenrath, R. A., & Miller, S. E. (1996.) Avoiding nuclear anarchy: Containing the threat of loose Russian 
nuclear weapons and fissile material. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, p. 65; (xxiii) The U.S. Customs Service 
has installed radiation detectors at various (undisclosed) ports of entry around the country in an effort 
to assess its ability to detect nuclear smuggling. However, it is highly unlikely that fissile materials, since 
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they do not emit radiation, or properly shielded substances would be detected. AP Newswire, July 2, 
1996. Reported in Nuclear Nonproliferation News, July 2, 1996; (xxiv) Grinstein, J. (1996.) Jihad and the 
Constitution: The First Amendment implications of combating religiously motivated terrorism. The Yale 
Law Journal, 105, p. 1347. For a more thorough explanation of the “clear and present danger” clause, 
see Schwartz, B. (1994.) Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and present danger or advocacy of unlawful action? 
The Supreme Court Review; (xxv) de Marenches & Andelman, D. A. (1992.) The Fourth World War: 
Diplomacy and espionage in the age of terrorism. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., p. 259; 
(xxvi) Gray, C. S. (1990.) War, peace and victory: Strategy and statecraft for the next century. New York, 
Simon and Schuster; (xxvii) Jeffrey Simon discusses one such approach to physical security, the Thermal 
Neutron Analysis machines, developed to detect explosives. In testing, however, the machines were not 
sensitive enough to detect small amounts of explosives which could bring down an aircraft. Additionally, 
the machines were incredibly expensive. Simon, J. D. (1994.) The terrorist trap: America’s experience 
with terrorism. Indianapolis, Indiana: Indiana University Press, pp. 397-398; (xxviii) Jenkins, P. 
(September, 1995.) Home-grown terror. American Heritage, pp. 39 - 46; (xxix) One such effort at 
coordination is the Miami Joint Task Force on Terrorism. Created in 1989 primarily as a result of drug-
related and anti-Castro violence, the Task Force includes local law enforcement, the Florida Department 
of Law Enforcement, Florida National Guard, law enforcement agencies from neighboring counties, and 
the national resources of Immigration and Naturalization Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms, Internal Revenue Service, Central Intelligence Agency, the Border Patrol, Customs 
Department, State Department, Secret Service and U.S. Marshals Service. Hoffman, B., & Riley, K. J. 
(1995.) Domestic terrorism: A national assessment of state and local preparedness. Santa Monica, 
California: RAND, p. 32; (xxx) G-7 declaration on terrorism. Released at the G-7 Economic Summit in 
Lyon, France, June 27, 1996. Internet accessed report: 
(http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/measures.html); (xxxi) Ministerial conference on 
terrorism: Agreement on 25 measures. Text of agreement released at the Ministerial Conference on 
Terrorism, Paris, France, July 30, 1996. Internet accessed report: 
(http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/measures.html); (xxxii) de Marenches & Andelman, D. A. 
(1992.) The Fourth World War: Diplomacy and espionage in the age of terrorism. New York: William 
Morrow and Company, Inc., p. 257; (xxxiii) Kent, S. (1949.) Strategic intelligence for American world 
policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949 (Keywords: Intelligence, Terrorism.) 
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